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If Pegasus existed, he would indeed be in space and time, but only 
because the word ‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not 
because ‘exists’ has spatio-temporal connotations. If spatio-temporal 
reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the cube root of 
27, that is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of 
thing.
W. V. Quine, “On What There Is”
Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or 
sorts or “modes”. One thinks of Meinong’s Existenz and Bestand, of 
Russell’s existence and subsistence, of Sartre’s être-en-soi and être-
pour-soi, and of Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz. 
But if there is more than one mode of being, what is the relation 
between the several modes of being and the existential quantifier? 
Does not the fact that there is a single existential quantifier strongly 
suggest that there is a single mode of being — or, perhaps better, 
that the concept “mode” has no application to being? I will put the 
idea that underlies this question in the form of an argument for the 
conclusion that there cannot be two or more modes of being.
Suppose we add to the language of first-order logic with identity 
a property abstraction operator, ‘Π’. This operator takes a variable 
and a sentence and makes a term in which that variable is not free. 
If the abstraction operator is applied to a variable α and a sentence 
in which α alone is free, the result is a closed term that denotes the 
property or attribute or quality expressed by that open sentence: the 
expression ‘Πx x is wise’ (“The property of being an x such that x is 
wise”) denotes wisdom, and ‘Πz z is brave’ denotes bravery or cour-
1 This paper is the text of the first of two LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics, 
which were presented at the University of Lisbon on 12 and 14 June, 2013.
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age — and so on. It seems to me that my description of this operator 
is unproblematical — provided at least that we do not insist that the 
terms it forms always have referents.2 (One would not want to sup-
pose that there was such a property as Πx x is a property and it is not 
the case that x has x.) I will suppose, however, that any such term 
that is formed from a meaningful and unambiguous open sentence 
denotes a property unless that term’s denoting a property implies 
a contradiction.3 That may not be a very satisfactory “comprehen-
sion principle”, but, really, no one knows what to do with Russell’s 
Paradox.
Now consider the property Πx $y y = x — the property of being 
an x is such that there is or exists a y such that y is identical with x, or 
the property of being a thing such that there is or exists something 
that is that thing.4 If we use the word ‘being’ as a noun or substan-
tive, and as a mass term rather than a count-noun — as the English 
equivalent of Sein or être (mass term, not count noun) — then (sure-
ly?) what this word denotes is nothing other than that property. At 
any rate, I don’t see what else its referent could be — just as I don’t 
see the referent of ‘wisdom’ could be if not Πx x is wise. And if that 
is so, then there cannot be multiple modes of being, owing simply 
to the fact that open sentences like ‘$y y = x’ and ‘something is x’ 
express — if Kant and Frege will forgive me — a single, perfectly 
determinate property, a property had by — if Meinong will forgive 
me — everything.
This argument seems to me to be unanswerable — provided that 
there is a unique existential quantifier. But suppose that what we 
have learned to call “the” existential quantifier is not unique. Sup-
pose that there is indeed more than one mode of being, and that each 
2 And provided we recognize that quantification into such terms (e.g., ‘$x $y x 
has Πz y is larger than z’) is quantification into an intensional context.
3 This does not rule out such properties as Πx  x ≠ x and Πx x is a cubical ball. 
There is no contradiction in the existence of such properties — the contradiction 
would be in their instantiation.
4 It is, to say the least, implausible to suppose that the existence of this proper-
ty entails a contradiction. For one thing, free logics aside, ‘$y y = x’ is equivalent 
to ‘x = x’, and the existence of the property self-identity can hardly be supposed to 
entail a contradiction.
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mode of being has, so to speak, its own existential quantifier.
It will be convenient, when we are supposing that there is more 
than one mode of being, also to suppose that we have an actual speci-
fication of these modes. I will suppose that there are exactly two. 
I will call them ‘existenz’ and ‘subsistence’. (Note that the former 
word has the German spelling.) Existenz, I stipulate, is the mode of 
being of concrete objects, and subsistence is the mode of being of 
abstract objects (whatever that distinction may come to). Everything 
I say will apply, with only trivial modifications, to any “list” of the 
modes of being you may care to put forward — Sartre’s or Hei-
degger’s for example.
Suppose, then, that a philosopher who holds that these are the 
two modes of being, existenz and subsistence, replies to the above 
argument by contending that there is a primitive and irreducible 
quantificational apparatus specific to existenz and a primitive and 
irreducible quantificational apparatus specific to subsistence. This 
is precisely the position of a certain fictional philosopher I’ll call 
“McHeidegger” — a personification of the interpretation of Hei-
degger’s philosophy of being that Kris McDaniel has presented in his 
well-known essay, “Ways of Being.” 5 My examination of the relation 
between quantification and modes of being will take the form of a 
critique of McHeidegger’s philosophy — the only philosophy I know 
of that addresses this issue. I will not consider the question whether 
Heidegger accepted all or any of the theses of the meta-ontology6 as-
cribed to him in McDaniel’s essay.7 I shall be concerned, rather, with 
some questions about that meta-ontology itself, that meta-ontology 
considered as a philosophical position, whoever may have accepted 
it. (McDaniel himself either accepts it or comes very close to accept-
5 Included in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.) Me-
tametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), pp. 290–319).
6 I use this word in the sense it has in current analytical metaphysics. It is not 
meant to be a translation of Heidegger’s ‘Metontologie’.
7 And I will not be concerned with the point that existenz and subsistence 
do not even remotely resemble the modes of being that actually figure in Hei-
degger’s Seinsphilosophie. (My “existenz” is of course not Heidegger’s Existenz. My 
“existenz” is, however, very like Meinong’s Existenz.)
ing it.) These questions have primarily to do with the implications 
of the meta-ontology for the logical validity of inferences involving 
particularity and universality.
This was prologue. Now the play. (Some of the ideas sketched 
in the prologue will be re-stated in the play — but in considerably 
more detail.)
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Let us suppose that, in addition to the familiar “generic” quantifiers 
(the particular quantifier8 ‘$’ and its dual, the universal quantifier 
‘∀’9), there are two pairs of “specific” quantifiers10, each member of 
one of the pairs being the dual of the other. And let us suppose that 
the two pairs are:
The concrete quantifiers               The abstract quantifiers
E   the existenzial quantifier      the subsistential quantifier
A   the general quantifier      the inclusive quantifier.
The motive for this supposition is to be found in the thesis that there 
are two modes of being and that each of them is in some sense so 
fundamental a feature of reality that it requires its own quantifica-
tional apparatus. The existenzial quantifier (we suppose) expresses 
existenz (the verb is ‘exizt’), the mode of being enjoyed by concrete 
8 I refrain from calling this operator by its customary name in order to avoid 
begging any questions — and also to avoid giving it a name that might be con-
fused with the name given to one of the specific quantifiers.
9 I follow the usage of Donald Kalish and Richard Montague: the symbols ‘$’ 
and ‘∀’ are called quantifiers and expressions like ‘$z’ and ‘∀y’ are called quantifier 
phrases. (Other writers call ‘$z’ and ‘∀y’ quantifiers.)
10 McDaniel’s terms are ‘unrestricted quantifier’ and ‘restricted quantifier’. 
(He does, however, speak of the generic and specific senses of ‘being’ and does 
sometimes apply these terms to the quantifiers that “express” those senses.) He 
recognizes (303) that his terminology is not entirely satisfactory, since “there is a 
sense in which any semantically primitive quantifier is an unrestricted quantifier.”
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particulars or reale Gegenstände (pick some term that you favor; a pre-
cise statement of the mode of being expressed by ‘E’ is not important 
for our purposes; what matters is that this operator should express 
one of two modes of being). And the subsistential quantifier (we 
further suppose) expresses subsistence or Bestand, the mode of being 
enjoyed by abstract objects or ideale Gegenstände (or what you will). 
So an existenzial quantification on a predicate is true just in the case 
that some “exiztent” satisfies that predicate, and a general quantifi-
cation on a predicate is true just in the case that all exiztents satisfy 
that predicate. And so for the subsistential and inclusive quantifiers, 
mutatis mutandis. And, finally, the particular quantifier expresses “ge-
neric being” — the “common element” of existenz and subsistence; 
that commonality in virtue of which both modes of being are modes 
of being, and the domain of the universal quantifier comprises every-
thing that participates in either mode of being.
According to McHeidegger, the specific quantifiers are the funda-
mental and semantically primitive quantifiers, and the generic quan-
tifiers are disjunctive and derived.11 (I don’t mean to imply that Mc-
Daniel supposes that existenz and subsistence are the modes of being 
recognized by the real philosopher named ‘Martin Heidegger’.)
2
Let us say that a formal mixed inference is an inference or argument 
whose constituent sentences (that is, its premises and its conclusion) 
contain quantifiers drawn from at least two of the three pairs $/∀, 
E/A, and / . And let us say that an informal mixed inference is an in-
ference or argument expressed in natural language that those who 
11 ‘Disjunctive’ has to be understood with some care. McDaniel says (306), 
“Heidegger recognizes a generic sense of ‘being’ that . . . represents something 
akin to a mere disjunction of the metaphysically basic ways of being.” (Italics in original.) 
But he had earlier (304) said, “ . . . Heidegger does not seem to think that the 
generic sense of ‘being’ is merely the disjunction of the various specific senses of 
‘being.’” I take it that the position McDaniel ascribes to Heidegger is something 
like this (assuming for the sake of the example that subsistence and existenz are 
the modes of being): ‘exists-generic’ does not mean ‘either subsists or exizts’; but 
the meaning of ‘exists-generic’ is such that ‘it exists-generic’ can properly be said 
of things that subsist and can, with equal propriety, be said of things that exizt.
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affirm the reality of existenz and subsistence as distinct modes of 
being and who insist that each mode be supplied with “its own” pair 
of specific quantifiers would find it natural to represent formally as a 
formal mixed inference.
I begin by presenting an argument that certainly seems to be an 
informal mixed inference by the terms of this definition — owing 
to the fact that it involves quantification (the quantificational appa-
ratus is informal: the quantificational apparatus of ordinary English) 
over both mathematicians and mathematical problems, and (given 
that there are such modes of being as existenz and subsistence) one 
must suppose that mathematicians exizt and mathematical problems 
subsist.
The Informal Mixed Argument
There is a problem in algebraic topology that I. M. James is un-
able to solve
I. M. James is an algebraic topologist
Every algebraic topologist is able to solve any problem in algebraic 
topology that any algebraic topologist is able to solve
If there is a problem in algebraic topology that no algebraic to-
pologist is able to solve, then no mathematician is able to solve 
that problem
Every problem in algebraic topology is a mathematical problem
hence,
There is a mathematical problem that no mathematician is able 
to solve.
And the Informal Argument certainly seems to be valid. After all, 
if it were presented as a “translation exercise” in a logic course, the 
instructor would certainly regard the following argument as a cor-
rect representation of the Informal Argument in (as Quine calls it), 
the canonical language of first-order logic:
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The Generic Formal Argument
$x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~ I. M. James is able 
to solve x)
I. M. James is an algebraic topologist
∀x ∀y ∀z (x is an algebraic topologist & y is an algebraic topologist 
& z is a problem in algebraic topology ⋅ → ⋅ x is able to solve z ↔ 
y is able to solve z)
∀x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~$y (y is an algebraic 
topologist & y is able to solve x) ⋅ →  ~$y (y is a mathematician 
& y is able to solve x))
∀x (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem)
hence,
$x (x is a mathematical problem & ~$y (y is a mathematician & y 
is able to solve x)).
And it would be easy to show that the Generic Formal Argument 
was valid by the methods set out in whatever the textbook in the 
course happened to be (the methods that one of my teachers liked to 
refer to collectively as “quantifier dropping and horseshoe pushing”).
3
Suppose, however, that the only quantifiers we had at our disposal 
were the four specific quantifiers mentioned in section 1 — the con-
crete quantifiers and the abstract quantifiers. Then (owing to the 
distinct modes of being enjoyed by mathematicians, on the one hand, 
and mathematical problems, on the other) if we wished to translate 
the Informal Argument into the quantifier-variable idiom, we should 
have to replace each generic quantifier in the Generic Formal Argu-
ment with the appropriate specific quantifier — thus producing the 
following argument (a “formal mixed inference”):
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The Specific Formal Argument
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~ I. M. James is able 
to solve x)
I. M. James is an algebraic topologist
Ax Ay z (x is an algebraic topologist & y is an algebraic topologist 
& z is a problem in algebraic topology ⋅ → ⋅ x is able to solve z ↔ 
y is able to solve z)
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~Ey (y is an algebraic 
topologist & y is able to solve x) ⋅ → ~Ey (y is a mathematician & 
y is able to solve x))
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem)
hence,
x (x is a mathematical problem & ~Ey (y is a mathematician & y 
is able to solve x)).
And what rules shall we consult if we wish to determine whether 
this argument is valid? Or, more generally, what rules shall we con-
sult if we wish to determine whether any given formal mixed infer-
ence is valid?
I will consider two ways to approach these questions. I’ll call 
them the Deep Approach and the Shallow Approach.
4
Advocates of the Deep Approach will dispute my statement that the 
Specific Formal Argument is a correct formal representation of the 
Informal Argument. They will insist that all the terms (all the vari-
ables and all the singular terms) that appear in a correct formal rep-
resentation of that argument must be “sorted”. (Singular terms must 
be of two “sorts”: terms of one sort denote exiztents and only exiz-
tents and terms of the other denote subsistents and only subsistents. 
And variables, too, must be sorted: into a “sort” bound by and only 
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by the concrete quantifiers and a sort bound by and only by the ab-
stract quantifiers). Let us accede to their demand; let the “concrete” 
variables be ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ . . . , and let the “abstract” variables be ‘x’, 
‘y’, ‘z’ . . . And let us distinguish “concrete” and “abstract” singular 
terms by a similar notational device.
A correct formal representation of the Informal Argument 
should, as the Deep Approachers see matters, look something like 
this:
The Specific Formal Argument (Sorted)
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~ I. M. James is able 
to solve x)
I. M. James is an algebraic topologist
Ax Ay z (x is an algebraic topologist & y is an algebraic topolo-
gist & z is a problem in algebraic topology ⋅ → ⋅ x is able to solve 
z ↔ y is able to solve z)
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology & ~Ey (y is an algebraic 
topologist & y is able to solve x) ⋅ → ~Ey (y is a mathematician 
& y is able to solve x))
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem)
hence,
x (x is a mathematical problem & ~Ey (y is a mathematician & 
y is able to solve x)).
Is this argument formally valid? The question is easily answered: it is. 
It is at any rate formally valid according to the treatments of “many-
sorted logic” that are available in the literature.12 And I have no doubt 
12 See Herbert B. Enderton A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, 2nd Edn (Har-
court/Academic Press, 2001), Section 4.3 (pp. 295-299), “Many-sorted Logic.” 
(I am grateful to Hannes Leitgeb and Chris Menzel for calling my attention to 
Enderton’s treatment of many-sorted logic.) Actually, despite my knowing refer-
ence to “the treatments of ‘many-sorted logic’ available in the literature,” this is 
the only such treatment I know of. But if there are others, I am confident that 
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that, if an informal mixed inference is intuitively equivalent to a spe-
cific formal argument with sorted variables, the informal inference 
will be intuitively logically valid if and only if the specific formal 
argument is formally valid.
Is the Deep Approach to the problem of mixed inferences there-
fore satisfactory? That will depend on whether the Deep Approachers 
recognize, in addition to the four specific quantifiers and the sorted 
variables they bind, the generic quantifiers and unsorted variables. 
If they do not recognize generic quantifiers and unsorted variables, 
they will have adopted a language of insufficient expressive power; 
that is, there will be things that can be said that they cannot say — 
general statements that can be expressed in English (and presumably 
in any natural language with an appropriate lexicon) that cannot be 
said in a formal language without generic quantification.13 The most 
important of these are certain “cross-modal generalizations” — gen-
eralizations over objects some of which exizt and some of which sub-
sist. For example:
Everything either exizts or subsists
Another cross-modal generalization that it may be impossible to ex-
press without generic quantification is:
Nothing both exizts and subsists.
I say that it may be impossible to express this statement without ge-
neric quantification because one might try to express it like this:
~Ex y (x = y).
(Or reverse the order of the existenzial and the subsistential quan-
tifier-phrases.) Whether this device “works”, however, depends on 
they are equivalent to Enderton’s. As Enderton says (p. 295), “As might be ex-
pected, nothing is drastically different from the usual one-sorted situation. None 
of the results of this section are at all deep, and most of the proofs are omitted.” 
The generalization of one-sorted logic that Enderton presents is so simple and 
natural that there doesn’t seem to be any possibility of a rival, non-equivalent 
development of many-sorted logic (other than those that correspond to rival, 
non-equivalent “developments” of ordinary one-sorted logic: a many-sorted free 
logic, for example).
13 As McDaniel says (297), “The generic concept of being is indispensable.”
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whether the logical vocabulary of our hypothetical language without 
generic quantification contains a generic or “unsorted” identity-sign, 
an identity-sign an occurrence of which can be flanked by terms of 
different sorts.14 Enderton’s many-sorted logic (see note 11) does not 
have such a sign (in his logic, each sort of term has its “own” identity-
sign), but I should think that it would be easy enough to add one. 
Models for many-sorted logic associate non-overlapping universes of 
discourse with terms of different sorts, and, therefore, the obvious 
adaptation of the usual model-theoretic treatment of ‘=’ will have 
the consequence that sentences formed by flanking the generic iden-
tity sign with singular terms of different sorts will “automatically” 
be false, and sentences like ‘z = y’ and ‘x = I. M. James’ will au-
tomatically be unsatisfiable. (But I speak under correction. I am no 
logician — and, as my colleague of beloved memory, the late Ralph 
McInerny, once said in a very similar context, that is no idle boast.)
However this may be, it is impossible to express the proposition 
that everything either exizts or subsists without the use of the uni-
versal quantifier. (And those who believe that existenz and subsis-
tence are distinct modes of being will regard this as an important 
thesis — even those of them who think that it is false.)
5
McDaniel will, however, point out that McHeidegger is not unable 
to express such important metaphysical theses as “Everything either 
exizts or subsists” and “Nothing both exizts and subsists”. He will 
remind us that McHeidegger affirms the existence (or perhaps we 
should say the subsistence) of the generic sense of ‘exist’ (albeit he 
does not regard it as fundamental or primitive) and thus rejects the 
thesis that the only quantifiers we have at our disposal are the spe-
cific quantifiers. If McHeidegger is right, we also have the generic 
quantifiers, the particular quantifier and the universal quantifier, “at 
our disposal”. To revert to the case of subsistence and existenz, we 
may express the proposition that everything either subsists or exizts 
in either of the following ways:
14 Note that the following truth is also inexpressible in a language without ge-
neric identity: I. M. James is not identical with the Kervaire Invariant 1 Problem.
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∀x ( y  y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x)
∀x ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x).15
(In the first if the specific quantifiers can bind unsorted variables; in 
the second if the specific quantifiers can bind only sorted variables. 
I will assume in the sequel that the concrete quantifiers bind only 
“existenz” variables and that the abstract quantifiers bind only “sub-
sistence” variables.) Of course, both expressions require the generic 
identity-sign, but, as we have seen, there seems to be no obstacle to 
adding the generic identity-sign to a many-sorted language.
But more must be said to enable the McHeiddegerian to deal with 
the problem of mixed inferences. There is still the problem of the va-
lidity of those arguments whose constituent sentences contain both 
generic and specific quantifiers. This argument, for example:
∀x ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x)
~$x y (x = y)
hence,
∀x Ey y = x.
(Everything is either subsistent or exiztent; Nothing is subsistent; 
hence, Everything is exiztent.) Or this argument:
$x$y  the mode of being of x is not the mode of being of y
∀x∀y (the mode of being of x is not the mode of being of y → ⋅ (Ez 
x = z ⋅ & z y = z) v (Ez y = z ⋅ & z x = z))
hence,
$x Ey x = y ⋅ &  $x y x = y.
(There are things that participate in different modes of being; If two 
things participate in different modes of being, one of them is exiztent 
and the other is subsistent; hence, Something is exiztent and some-
thing is subsistent.)
Now there is an obvious and easy general solution to the problem 
15 Or as the perhaps harder-to-parse ‘∀x ( x x = x ⋅ v Ex x = x)’.
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of determining the validity of formal mixed inferences — general in 
that it applies to all mixed arguments, both those that contain only 
specific quantifiers and those that contain both generic and specific 
quantifiers. (It will also apply to arguments that contain only con-
crete quantifiers and arguments that contain only abstract quantifi-
ers.) At the end of section 3, I said, “There are two ways to approach 
these questions. I’ll call them the Deep Approach and the Shallow 
Approach”. The Shallow Approach and “the obvious and easy solu-
tion to the problem” are one and the same device — to wit, sys-
tematically to replace all the specific quantifiers in the inference we 
are testing for validity with appropriately restricted generic quanti-
fiers (“for purposes of determining validity”, as one might say). We 
might, for example, introduce a predicate ‘Z’ to express existenz, 
and a predicate ‘S’ to express subsistence. (That is, ‘Zx’ abbreviates 
‘x exizts’ and ‘Sy’ abbreviates ‘y subsists’ and so on.) So, for example, 
replacing the specific quantifiers in the following two sentences with 
appropriately restricted generic quantifiers (binding generic vari-
ables):
∀x ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x)
Ax x  x ≠ x
yield, respectively,
∀x ($y (Zy & y = x) v $y (Sy & y = x))
and
∀x∀y (Zx & Sy ⋅ → x ≠ y).
Let us call the sentence obtained by so replacing all the specific quan-
tifiers in a sentence with restricted generic quantifiers the “generic 
representation” of that sentence. And we may say that an inference or 
argument is the “generic representation” of a “specific” inference or 
argument (an inference or argument containing specific quantifiers) 
if it is the result of replacing each of its constituent sentences with its 
generic representation. We now consider
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The Generic-representation Criterion of Formal Validity (sc. of 
specific arguments)
A specific argument is formally valid if and only if its generic 
representation is formally valid (i.e., valid in ordinary quantifier 
logic).
(All formal mixed inferences are specific arguments, but arguments 
containing only concrete quantifiers and arguments containing only 
abstract quantifiers are specific arguments and are not formal mixed 
inferences.) The section of Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction to 
Logic (note 11) that is devoted to many-sorted logic has a sub-section 
called “Reduction to One-Sorted Logic”. The results presented in 
that sub-section imply that a specific argument that contains no ge-
neric quantifiers is valid in many-sorted logic if and only if it is valid 
according to the Generic-representation Criterion. It obviously fol-
lows that the same holds for specific arguments that do contain ge-
neric quantifiers.
There is a sense in which the Generic-representation Criterion 
treats ‘Z’ and ‘S’ as “logically inert”, since they are not mentioned in 
the rules that one would consult to determine whether the generic 
representation of a formal mixed inference was valid — that is, the 
inference rules of ordinary (i.e., generic) quantifier logic. One who 
is applying the Generic-representation Criterion will treat, e.g., ‘Zx’ 
and ‘Sy’ as “just two more open sentences”, sentences that have no 
more logical significance than ‘x is a mathematician’ and ‘y is a math-
ematical problem’.
We need not, in fact, have introduced ‘Z’ and ‘S’ by stipulating 
that ‘Zx’ was to abbreviate ‘x exizts’ and that ‘Sy’ was to abbreviate 
‘y subsists’ (and so on). We could instead have introduced, e.g., ‘Zx’ 
and ‘Sy’ as abbreviations for, respectively, ‘Ex x = x’ and ‘ x x = y’. 
On that reading of ‘Z’ and ‘S’, the sentence
∀x ($y (Zy & y = x) v $y (Sy & y = x))
is an abbreviation of:
∀x ($y (Ey y  = y  ⋅ & y = x) v $y ( y y = y ⋅ & y = x)).
On that understanding of ‘Z’ and ‘S’, those symbols can be regarded 
as devices for “isolating” the all the occurrences of the specific quan-
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tifiers in a specific argument inside “logically inert” predicates. And 
we could say that, e.g., the argument
∀x (Ex x  = x ⋅ → (x is a mathematician → $y ( x x = y ⋅ & y is a 
mathematical problem & ~ x is able to solve y)).
$x (Ex x = x ⋅ & x is a mathematician)
hence,
$x ( x x  = x ⋅ & x is a mathematical problem)
was the “specifically isolated generic representation” of the argument
Ax (x is a mathematician → x (x is a mathematical problem & 
~ x is able to solve x))
Ex x is a mathematician
hence,
x x is a mathematical problem.
And we could then state the Generic-representation Criterion this 
way:
A specific argument is formally valid if and only if its specifically 
isolated generic representation is formally valid
One might wonder whether McHeidegger would be willing to ac-
cept the Generic-representation Criterion as not only a true state-
ment but as a complete and satisfactory account of the validity of 
specific inferences. If he were indeed willing to solve the problem 
of mixed inferences in that way, it would be interesting to hear his 
response to the questions posed at the end of the following rather 
lengthy speech:
If, as you say, the specific quantifiers are the fundamental quanti-
fiers, the semantically primitive quantifiers, and if, as you say, the 
generic quantifiers are non-fundamental, semantically derived, 
and disjunctive, the criterion of formal validity for arguments 
couched in the quantifier-variable idiom amounts to this:
To determine whether an argument involving quantifiers is 
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formally valid, replace each occurrence of a fundamental, se-
mantically primitive quantifier in the argument with an oc-
currence of its non-fundamental, semantically derived, and 
disjunctive counterpart (restricted by the apposite placement 
of a suitable “logically inert” open sentence like ‘Zy’ or ‘ x x 
= x’); then test the resulting argument for validity by apply-
ing the rules set out in your favorite logic textbook to the oc-
currences of the non-fundamental, semantically derived, and 
disjunctive quantifiers it contains. If, therefore, one wishes to 
determine whether an argument involving quantifiers is for-
mally valid, in the final analysis, the only inference-rules one 
will attend to are those that govern the non-fundamental, se-
mantically derived, and disjunctive quantifiers. There is no 
need even to bother to formulate inference-rules that govern 
the fundamental, semantically primitive quantifiers, since, 
to test an argument for validity, one must first eliminate the 
fundamental, semantically primitive quantifiers; or at any rate 
one must permit the fundamental quantifiers to occur only 
in expressions like ‘Ex x =z’ and ‘ x x = y’ — expressions 
which have no more significance in the matter of determining 
inferential validity than (respectively) such significance as is 
contained in the descriptions “a sentence in which ‘z’ is free 
(and no other variable is free)” and  “a sentence in which ‘y’ is 
free (and no other variable is free)”.
Is that not a rather strange criterion of validity? Is it plausible to 
suppose that a linguistic item — in any syntactical category — 
that is non-fundamental, semantically derived, and disjunctive 
plays an essential role in the criterion for determining whether 
an inference is formally valid? Is it plausible to suppose that quan-
tifiers that are fundamental and semantically primitive have no 
role to play in the criterion for deciding the validity of arguments 
whose logical structures obviously depend on the way in which 
occurrences of quantifiers and of the variables they bind are dis-
tributed in their constituent sentences?
If McHeidegger refuses to regard the Generic-representation Cri-
terion as the key to the solution of the problem of mixed inferences 
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— if he rejects the Shallow Approach to this problem —, he will 
probably wish to propose an alternative solution. Might he propose 
the following solution?
The solution to the problem of mixed inferences is to “paraphrase 
away” all the non-fundamental and semantically derived quanti-
fiers (that is, all the generic quantifiers) that occur in any mixed 
inference we propose to test for validity — systematically to re-
write the sentences in which they occur as sentences containing 
only fundamental and underived quantifiers. Consider first the 
particular quantifier. We eliminate occurrences of the particular 
quantifier by “disjunctive paraphrase” (working “from the inside 
out”, as they say, starting with those generic quantifiers such that 
no generic quantifier occurs within their scope). For example, 
the sentence
$x (x is a mathematical problem & ~$y (y is a mathematician 
& y is able to solve x))
is paraphrased as
Ex (x is a mathematical problem &
~ [Ey (y is a mathematician & y is able to solve x) v y (y is a 
mathematician & y is able to solve x)]
v
x (x is a mathematical problem &
~ [Ey (y is a mathematician & y is able to solve x) v y (y is a 
mathematician & y is able to solve x)].
(The paraphrase displays clearly the “disjunctive” character of the 
particular quantifier.)
 Consider now the universal quantifier. (This example will 
be simpler than the previous example in that it will not involve a 
generic quantifier that occurs within the scope of a generic quan-
tifier.) The sentence
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∀x (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem)
is paraphrased as
Ax (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem)
&
x (x is a problem in algebraic topology → x is a mathematical 
problem).
(Strictly speaking, it is only the particular quantifier that is — 
in any sense — disjunctive. The universal quantifier, since it is 
the dual of the particular quantifier, is “conjunctive”.) After all 
the generic quantifiers that occur in the constituent sentences of 
an argument have been eliminated by paraphrase, the resulting 
“purely specific” argument may be tested for validity by applying 
the rules of many-sorted logic.
But this proposal is unsatisfactory for a reason closely connected 
with our earlier observation that some “cross-modal generalizations” 
cannot be expressed without the use of the generic quantifiers. Con-
sider the following cross-modal generalization:
∀x ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x).
(Everything either subsists or exizts.) The method of paraphrase il-
lustrated above yields, when applied to this sentence,
x ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x)
&
Ax ( y y = x ⋅ v Ey y = x).
Formally speaking, this sentence is simply a theorem of many-sorted 
logic. If the quantifiers have their intended meanings, it says (more 
or less) that everything subsistent is either subsistent or exiztent and 
everything exiztent is either subsistent or exiztent. The proposal is 
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unsatisfactory because the paraphrases on which it relies reduce sub-
stantive meta-ontological theses to logical trivialities.
Here is a second solution to the problem of mixed inferences that 
a McHeideggerian might propose — and it is the only other proposal 
that occurs to me:
Use the Generic-representation Criterion, yes, but only to deter-
mine the validity of formal mixed inferences whose constituent 
sentences contain the generic quantifiers — the non-fundamental 
and semantically derived quantifiers. But to determine the valid-
ity of formal mixed inferences whose constituent sentences con-
tain only fundamental and semantically primitive quantifiers, use 
the techniques of many-sorted logic.
As we have observed, however, an argument that contains specific 
quantifiers but no generic quantifiers is valid according to the rules 
of many-sorted logic if and only if it is valid according to the Gener-
ic-representation Criterion. (And, as we have noted, this is no deep 
result of mathematical logic.) This observation convinces me that a 
sentence containing specific quantifiers and sorted terms and its ge-
neric/unsorted “counterpart” are nothing more than notational vari-
ants. I will try to make this conviction of mine at least plausible (to 
anyone who does not already find it plausible) by means of a parable.
6
McHeidegger Triumphant Confronts the Martians: A Parable
By the end of the twenty-first century, McHeidegger and his disci-
ples had triumphed. The McHeideggerian meta-ontology was taught 
in every university, and students of formal logic were taught many-
sorted logic. They were also taught unsorted or generic logic, but 
were strictly enjoined to use this logic only in very special cases — 
namely, when engaged in reasoning from premises some of which 
could be expressed only by the use of the generic quantifiers.
One of the many shocks that followed the discovery in 2102 of 
the ancient hidden Martian civilization (the Martians dwelt in vast 
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cities far beneath the surface of their planet) occurred when it trans-
pired that the Martians were not McHeideggerians. The Martians 
were excellent logicians, and, in metaphysics, many of them were 
platonists. But they perversely insisted on employing only one par-
ticular/general quantifier-pair in all their reasoning — in their rea-
soning about every subject-matter and every kind of object. That 
is to say, their only quantifiers were the generic quantifiers. And, 
when they had learned Terrestrial languages and the human Prin-
cipia-derived logical notation, they compounded their logical per-
versity by insisting that they could understand the so-called specific 
quantifiers only as restricted generic quantifiers. Indeed, when their 
logic texts began to incorporate material on Terrestrial logic, they 
went so far as to suggest that the specific quantification of Terrestrial 
logic was nothing more than a notational variant on appropriately re-
stricted generic quantification. Their textbooks included what they 
were pleased to call translation algorithms, algorithms based on tables 
of schemata like this one:
 Ex (. . . x . . .)  $x (Zx & ( . . . x . . .))
 Ax (. . . x . . .)  ∀x (Zx → ( . . . x . . .))
 x (. . . x . . .)  $x (Sx & ( . . . x . . .))
 x (. . . x . . .)  ∀x (Sx → ( . . . x . . .)).
Martian students were actually taught to think of the schemata dis-
played in the left-hand column of this table as abbreviations of their 
counterparts in the right-hand column!
Such perversity led to much head-shaking among Terrestrial 
metaphysicians and logicians over the philosophical limitations of the 
Martian mind. Fortunately, however, it had no untoward practical 
consequences, since the Martians and the Terrestrials always agreed 
about which arguments expressed in the specific-quantifier notation 
were valid. (The Martians aggravated the effects of their perversity 
by pointing out that while they were able to get along without the 
specific quantifiers, Terrestrials were unable to get along without 
the generic quantifiers. They sometimes suggested that it was hard to 
see why the semantically fundamental quantifiers should be “option-
Peter van Inwagen20
al” and the derived quantifiers “required”. That was just plain rude, 
when you think about it. And that was not the end of their rudeness, 
for it was not uncommon to hear Martian logicians say things like, 
“You Terrestrials at least see how we Martians claim to derive the 
specific quantifiers from the generic quantifiers — even if you insist 
that what we call a derivation is not properly so called. But could you 
just fill me in on how you Terrestrials derive the generic quantifiers 
from the specific quantifiers? — for I suppose that, by calling the 
generic quantifiers ‘derived’, you are claiming to have constructed 
such a derivation. I ask because I don’t think I’ve ever seen the deriva-
tion actually written down anywhere”. That was really rude.)
Here endeth the parable.
7
I have to say that I’m a Martian — by philosophical conviction if not 
by biological ancestry. And I have to say that I don’t see what it could 
be that the Terrestrials (in the parable) know or are aware of or ap-
preciate that the Martians don’t know or aren’t aware of or don’t 
appreciate.
“Well, they don’t know about, aren’t aware of, and don’t appreci-
ate, the fact that there are two modes of being; and, further, they 
don’t know (etc.) that existenz and subsistence are so different that 
each requires its own pair of specific quantifiers; and, further still, 
they don’t know (etc.) that the generic quantifiers are not semanti-
cally fundamental but derived — semantically parasitic on the spe-
cific quantifiers, as it were.”
To me, however, the fact that the Martians get along perfectly 
well without the specific quantifiers (as indeed Terrestrials did be-
fore the advent of McHeidegger), strongly suggests that there’s just 
nothing to this idea of modes of being. (And let us not forget the 
fact that the Terrestrials, for their part, are not capable of getting 
along without the generic quantifiers.) It suggests to me that the 
so-called specific quantifiers are a manifestation of a fundamental 
meta-ontological error that I, a proponent of the “thin conception of 
being, have more than once contended is the foundation of the idea 
(endemic among the proponents of “thick” conceptions of being) that 
there are distinct and irreducible modes of being: the error of ascrib-
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ing to the being of a thing a feature that properly belongs to its nature. 
If I may quote myself (I was speaking of Sartre’s distinction between 
être-pour-soi and être-en-soi, but the point I was making was a general 
one and applies to the position of any philosopher who postulates 
distinct modes of being):
There is, of course, a vast difference between free, conscious agents 
like ourselves and mere inanimate objects. I believe this quite as firmly 
as Sartre does. But to insist, as I do, that this difference does not con-
sist in the one sort of thing’s having a different sort of being from the 
other’s is not to depreciate it. The vast difference between me and a 
table does not consist in our having vastly different sorts of being (Das-
ein, dass sein, “that it is”); it consists rather in our having vastly different 
sorts of nature (Wesen, was sein, “what it is”). If you prefer, what the table 
and I are like is vastly different. This is a perfectly trivial thing to say: 
that a vast difference between A and B must consist in a vast difference 
in their natures. But if a distinction can be made between a thing’s 
being and its nature, this trivial truth is in competition with a certain 
statable falsehood. And if one denies the trivial at the outset of one’s 
investigations, there is no hope for one later on.16
My choice of Sartre as an example of a philosopher whose philosophy 
exhibits the “fundamental meta-ontological error” whose character 
I am attempting to describe should not be taken to imply that I sup-
pose that the error has been confined to Sartre’s side of the English 
Chanel. That is by no means the case. Bertrand Russell, for example, 
has written,17
At the end of the preceding chapter, we saw that such entities as rela-
tions appear to have a being which is in some way different from that of 
physical objects, and also different from that of minds or sense-data. In 
the present chapter we have to consider what is the nature of this kind 
of being, and also what objects there are that have this kind of being.
We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in 
space and time . . . Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects 
exist. But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they subsist 
or have being,18 where ‘being’ is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless.
16 “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment,” in Metametaphysics: New 
Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (see n. 1), p. 477.
17 The first quoted passage contains the opening words of Chapter IX of The 
Problems of Philosophy; the second occurs near the end of that chapter.
18 Russell’s ‘existence’/‘subsistence’ distinction seems to be taken from Mei-
nong; if so he has reproduced it imperfectly, particularly in the second passage. 
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I have no real argument against the meta-ontological position present-
ed in these two quotations. They do, however, tempt me to rant for 
a bit. I will allow myself to succumb to temptation. Here, in lieu of 
an argument, is my rant.
No, Russell, no! Relations are vastly different from tables, yes, 
but that’s just to say that the members of one of those two classes of 
objects have vastly different natures from the members of the other 
— that the properties of relations are vastly different from the properties 
of tables. For example relations are, as you say, not in space and time 
and tables are in space and time. There. When you’ve said that, that’s 
what you’ve said. Relations lack the property spatio-temporality and 
tables have it. That’s an enormous difference between relations and 
tables, all right. (And of course, there are other things you might say: 
that things stand in relations and things don’t — in that sense, at any 
rate —, stand in tables, or that relations exist necessarily and tables 
contingently; one could go on and on.) But when you’ve described 
the radically different properties that relations and tables have, you 
have not only done everything that is needed to describe the vast dif-
ference between relations and tables, you have done everything that 
can be done to describe it. That’s what describing a vast difference is. 
Stop trying to do something more when there’s nothing more to be 
done: stop trying to express the vastness of the difference between 
relations and tables by saying that they have different kinds of being.19
For Meinong, Existenz and Bestand are the two modes of Sein; he would certainly 
not have used ‘Bestand’ and ‘Sein’ interchangeably. And one does see his point: 
Would Russell really have been willing to say that Trinity College did not have 
being? He is truer to Meinong in the first passage, where he speaks of relations as 
having a different kind of being from “that of ”, e.g., physical objects.
19 I thank Hannes Leitgeb and Chris Menzel for extremely helpful comments on 
a draft of this essay (comments that have led to extensive revisions). I also thank 
Daniel Durante for extensive correspondence on many of the matters raised in 
this paper, correspondence from which I learned a great deal, even though his 
arguments failed to convince me that his central thesis was correct — to wit, that 
it is wrong to suppose that there is such a thing as “the” existential or particular 
quantifier and such a thing as “the” universal quantifier. (His position is that “clas-
sical” logic has its own pair of quantifiers, and intuitionistic logic has its own pair 
of quantifiers — and so for paraconsistent logic, free logic, fuzzy logic, and many 
other “logics.” Despite his very able defense of this thesis, I remain unconvinced.) 
Finally, I wish to thank Kris McDaniel for his insightful comments on an earlier 
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version of this paper. I am sorry to say that, insightful as they were, they did not 
convince me that there is any flaw in the case I have presented against the idea of 
modes of being.
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